responded to an article in which I criticized proposals by socialists to give markets marginal role (Hodgson, 1998). This present essay continues the debate, raises some additional issues and considers some later works by Adaman and Devine.
Adaman and Devine fail on both these counts, and I shall elaborate on the inadequacy of their criteria below. In response to my challenge they propose that similar demarcatory criteria are actually in operation within modern capitalism. They point to the 'multi-divisional form of firm organization'. In these firms, according to Adaman and Devine (2001: 231-2) : the headquarters establishes divisions, receives their profits, monitors their performance and decides whether they should be expanded, contracted or closed and whether new divisions should be established. Although the divisions may have a decentralized budget for minor investment, the headquarters acts as an internal capital market and is responsible for major investment and disinvestments. … Thus, the M-firm may be thought of as institutionalising the distinction between market exchange and market forces.
Note that Adaman and Devine make explicit neither the clear rules nor the demarcation criteria; they simply claim that the distinction has been operationalized in practice within Mform capitalist corporations. Even if their observation were accurate, it is not adequate. A request for detailed criteria is not answered simply by pointing to a domain where such criteria are allegedly operationalized.
In addition, and unfortunately for Adaman and Devine, their empirical claim is inaccurate, in at least two respects. First, the M-form firm does not involve a 'corporate structure in which the divisions engage in market exchange ' (Adaman and Devine, 2002: 346 n.) . In the M-form corporation it is the 'legal person' of the corporation (not its divisions) that holds property rights and can exchange products on the market. Divisions may transfer goods or services internally with the firm and keep their own accounts, but this does not involve the transfer of property rights and thus it is not exchange proper. I have made this argument at length elsewhere, so the details will not be repeated here (Hodgson, 2002) . Adaman and Devine follow the regrettable practice of some mainstream economists in obfuscating the legal nature of the firm and its property rights, and seeing 'markets' in places that -by sensible definition -they do not exist.
Second, the evidence does not suggest that M-form firms have successfully operationalized a distinction between strategic and major investment at the centre and tactical and minor investment in the divisions. In reality, operationalizing the distinction between the rights of corporate divisions and the corporate centre has been a continuous and unresolved source of tension within prominent M-form firms. Robert Freeland (1996a Freeland ( , 1996b Freeland ( , 2001 shows that historically there has been a problem of demarcating the powers and responsibilities of the divisions and the centre with the M-form firm. A crucial difference between the M-form firm in reality, on the one hand, and the proposal by Adaman and Devine, on the other other, is that the former involves multiple centres of power, each implementing its own criteria to separate the powers of the divisions and the centre, whereas the latter depends on a single set of (unclear) criteria devised by Adaman and Devine themselves. Hence, in the case of the M-form firm, the different sets of demarcation criteria are to some extent tested by the performance of the firm itself, and its capacity to survive in the market. No such test or corrective exists in the Adaman-Devine proposal. If the demarcation criteria place excessive limits on the right to enforce decisions without resort to the hierarchy of committees, then there is no obvious power or mechanism to correct any bureaucratic excess. This is a serious limitation to the Adaman-Devine proposal and does not apply to the M-form firm.
Some Illustrations
To show the weaknesses of the Adaman-Devine demarcation criteria, consider the following illustrations. In each case I ask Adaman and Devine whether 'market exchange' or 'market forces' are involved. Upon the answer to this question depends whether the decision can be made and enforced autonomously, or would require referral to the hierarchy of participatory committees. 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Hodgson (1998) argued that the system proposed by Adaman and Devine would often stifle innovations by requiring them to be approved by a network of committees. The essential point here is that much successful innovation depends on the intuitions of a minority, which is often unable to persuade the majority due to the nature of innovation itself. Most people tend to prefer the tested and the familiar. Adaman and Devine (2001, 2002) duck this argument to propose instead a unitary system of decision-making in which the majority always rules.
There is no denying that majorities can sometimes innovate, as Adaman and Devine (2002) explore at some length, but they simply ignore the implications of their proposed curtailment of innovations that do not obtain majority approval.
There is a high likelihood of error here. For example, when the first electronic computer was developed in Manchester in the 1940s, it was thought by a majority of experts to be so powerful that only one model would be required in the whole country. No-one fully appreciated the possible uses of the computer beyond a mere calculator, and as a processor of vast amounts of non-numeric as well as numeric information. There is no obvious reason why a more participatory decision-making system would have had a different opinion at that time.
Essentially, many technological and institutional innovations depend on the promotion of a minority view that is not widely supported or acknowledged at the outset.
Hence another advantage of a market system is that, within limits and with its own defects, it does offer some scope for inventors or entrepreneurs with new ideas -which are inevitably regarded by some as doomed or strange -to seek a market for their innovations and to benefit from any success. This has always been an important explanation for the technological dynamism of capitalism, and it has frequently been raised in the socialist calculation debate as a serious limitation comprehensive central planning. This point remains important, even if some innovation is possible within other organizational structures, and may be motivated other than by profit.
The response of Adaman and Devine (2001: 235) to this argument is somewhat surprising and symptomatic. They admit that innovation was discussed 'only briefly' in Devine (1988) and 'it is only in … more recent work' that it is developed more fully. 6 I ask the reader to reflect upon this admission: a major attempt to establish the workings of a planned economy, that has attracted some support on the left, admittedly addressed the central topic of innovation 'only briefly' and more than a decade passed before sufficient attention was by admission devoted to this topic. The history of socialism is full of proposals that are high in sentiment and morality but low in operational detail. Sadly, despite its rare and commendable attempt to consider actual economic mechanisms of decision-making, the Adaman-Devine proposal fails to avoid the same criticism.
According to the Adaman-Devine proposal, innovation cannot be allowed free access to the market. Any proposed innovation must be considered by the committees. Adaman and Devine (2001: 235) try to deal with the problem of uncertainty of success by decreeing that the committees must entertain a multiplicity and 'variety' of innovations with a 'pluralistic set of criteria'. After due experimentation and testing the superior and more socially useful innovations will be chosen: 'the criteria and interests involved in selecting across the innovations that emerge will determine the outcome of the innovation process.'
What they fail to show is how it is ensured that a sufficient variety of innovations will be chosen within a 'single participatory process ' (Adaman and Devine, 2002: 352) with a sufficiently 'pluralistic set of criteria'. Even the history of capitalism is littered with inventions that failed, or nearly failed, to get the backing of financiers or sponsors, even when many such independent bodies were approached. The requirement of committee approval, within a unitary rather than a polycentric system of committees, would make the chances worse, not better.
Conclusion
One of the biggest weaknesses in the Adaman-Devine proposal is that provides little separation of powers, except at the periphery of decision-making, and even here any autonomy at the periphery is inadequately demarcated and protected. It proposes participation, but in its name it requires submission and interference, in regard to all but at best the most trivial of economic decisions.
To this weakness, which has been characteristic of socialism since the inception of that term in the 1830s (Hodgson, 1999) , their proposal adds another. Instead of autonomy it heralds a life of participation on committees. Furthermore, the limits of committee interference in decision-making at every level of society are not clearly laid down. The proposal that everyone has the right to participate in committees that affect them does not solve the problem of practically unlimited committee power. If everyone must spend much of his or her time running round from meeting to meeting, then genuine and fruitful participation is diminished.
In practice, the Adaman-Devine proposal would end up as a monstrous apparatus of unlimited interference and endless deliberation. Its unitary structure of interlocking committees lacks an effective separation and plurality of powers. To rectify these omissions, people must have the right to make several important decisions concerning their lives and their property themselves, subject to some reasonable laws and constraints. Within broad limits, people have the right to autonomy and privacy, and to be protected to a large degree from the interference of individuals or committees, even if the latter may claim that they are affected by actions within this zone of self-rule. This also means retaining within broad limits all legitimate rights to buy and sell property -and retaining a substantial economic role for the market. Socialist doctrine has no chance whatsoever of survival unless it fully accepts and adjusts to this fact.
